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As is known, military intervention by the U.S.-led coalition was commenced in September 
2014 in Syria. The justification invoked by some participants of the coalition was that the 
Syrian government was “unwilling or unable” to deal with Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), an international terrorist group. The “unwilling or unable” test gives rise 
to various debates among international scholars and practitioners. Some international 
publicists argue that military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test 
is an emerging rule of customary international law, while others are rather opposed to 
it. The U.S. announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Syria on 19 December 
2018. This, however, does not mean an immediate cessation of operations of the U.S.-led 
coalition in Syria. It is expressed in the statement made on 6 February 2019 by Mike 
Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, in which he articulated that the arms cut in Syria 
is not a shift in mission but a strategic turn in essence. What can be inferred is that it 
seems unlikely that the military intervention of the U.S.-led coalition in Syria will be 
terminated in the near future. In fact, it arouses deep concern of humanity that the 
military intervention in Syria justified by the “unwilling or unable” test might recur in 
other regions or states. In this respect, the present article argues the compatibility of 
military intervention based on the “unwilling or unable” test proposed by some states, 
including the U.S., and some international publicists under universal principles of 
customary international law formation and international conventions.
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Introduction
After the end of the Cold war, particularly in the 21st century, the number of military 
interventions against sovereign states under various kinds of justifications rapidly 
increased. Afghanistan, iraq, yemen, syria, and Libya have been the subjects of such 
military interventions. some intervening states relied on requests or consents of the 
territorial states or the authorization of the united Nations security Council, while 
others resorted to the “unwilling or unable” test as a legal ground for use of defensive 
force on a territorial state.
Military interventions justified by the “unwilling or unable” test are often carried 
out in order to deal with non-state actors operating within the boundary of a territorial 
state. the most typical, recent example is the military intervention in syria being carried 
out by the u.s.-led coalition to defeat islamic state of iraq and the Levant (isiL).
Military interventions are being carried out not only in syria but also in iraq. the 
u.s.-led coalition initiated military action in iraq on 8 August 20141 and in syria on 
22 september 2014.2
while the legality of the former has never been challenged, the latter is very 
much debated, especially the “unwilling or unable” test that was advanced by some 
intervening states as a legal basis for military actions against isiL in syria.
1  karine Bannelier-Christakis, Military Interventions Against ISIL in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and the Legal Basis 
of Consent, 29(3) Leiden Journal of international Law 743, 750 (2016).
2  Id. at 766.
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Among justifications provided by some intervening states, including the united 
states of America, self-defense on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test was 
the main justification for the airstrikes against isiL in syria. On 23 september 2014, 
the united states sent a letter to the security Council justifying the launch of an air 
campaign against isiL on the syrian territory. According to this letter,
isiL and other terrorist groups in syria are a threat not only to iraq, but also 
to many other countries, including the united states and our partners in the 
region and beyond. States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with 
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, when, as is the case here, the government of 
the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of 
its territory for such attacks. The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will 
not confront these safe havens effectively itself. Accordingly, the united states 
has initiated necessary and proportionate military actions in syria in order 
to eliminate the ongoing isiL threat to iraq, including by protecting iraqi 
citizens from further attacks and by enabling iraqi forces to regain control 
of iraq’s borders. in addition, the United States has initiated military actions in 
Syria against al-Qaida elements in Syria known as the Khorasan Group to address 
terrorist threats that they pose to the United States and our partners and allies.3
some states that took part in the u.s.-led coalition, including Australia and turkey 
supported the “unwilling or unable” test as advanced by the united states in the 
letter.
On the other hand, the test is very much disputed by a considerable number of 
states, including russia, which is also taking military actions in syria.
the “unwilling or unable” test is one of the legal justifications for unilateral military 
actions in self-defense, when the government of the state where the threat is located 
is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks. According 
to the “unwilling or unable” test, if a territorial state is willing and able to eliminate 
terrorist threats posed to a victim state by a non-state actor, the victim state cannot 
act in self-defense.4 however, although the territorial state is willing to deal with 
a non-state actor, its inability to effectively eliminate the threat would result in the 
right of a victim state to act in self-defense against the non-state actor. such inability 
of the territorial state is attributable to loss of control over parts of its territory where 
the non-state actor operates and to lack of law enforcement capability.5
3  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 23 september 2014 from the Permanent representative of the 
united states of America to the united Nations addressed to the secretary-General, 23 september 
2014, s/2014/695. (emphasis added)
4  Ashley s. deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 
52(3) virginia Journal of international Law 483 (2012).
5  Id. at 525 & 527.
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the term “unwilling or unable” began to be officially used since the publication 
of the article titled “Principles of international Law on the use of Force by states in 
self-defence” by the Chatham house in 2006 and relatively all-inclusive definition 
was reached by N. schrijver and L. van den herik in “Leiden Policy recommendations 
on Counter-terrorism and international Law” published in 2010.6
however, a similar theory according to which it would be allowed to target 
a territorial state that is unable to deal with non-state actors dates back to the 1970s. 
it was used by the u.s. to justify actions against Cambodia. the legal basis the u.s. 
put forward was that the Cambodian government lost control over the relevant areas 
and the areas where the attacks had been carried out were “completely occupied 
and controlled by North vietnamese forces.”7 the theory was also used by israel in 
the 1980s to justify actions abroad against the Palestine Liberation Organization by 
alleging that it should be allowed to target a state harboring a terrorist group.8 in 
1995, turkey invoked iraqi government’s inability to exercise effective control over 
northern parts of its territory to justify its attacks against kurds in iraq and the u.s. 
state department voiced its support of the turkish incursion in a press briefing:
…a country under the united Nations Charter has the right in principle 
to use force to protect itself from attacks from a neighboring country if that 
neighboring state is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory 
for such attacks.9
the relationship between the “unwilling or unable” test and use of force has been 
researched by Ashley deeks in her extensive study “‘unwilling or unable’: toward 
a Normative Framework for extraterritorial self-defense” published in 2012. the aim 
of her study was to establish a new normative framework for extraterritorial self-
defense. in the study, deeks attempted to develop normative factors that define 
what it means for a territorial state to be “unwilling or unable” to eliminate threats 
posed by a non-state actor since the legitimacy of the “unwilling or unable” test is 
undermined by its lack of content. the first normative element developed by deeks 
is the “prioritization of consent and cooperation.”10 According to this element, a victim 
should obtain a territorial state’s consent to use force within the latter’s borders and 
6  Olivier Corten, The “Unwilling or Unable” Test: Has it Been, and Could it be, Accepted?, 29(3) Leiden Journal 
of international Law 777, 778 (2016).
7  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 30 March 1970 from the deputy Permanent representative of Cambodia 
to the united Nations addressed to the President of the security Council, 30 March 1970, s/9729.
8  Corten 2016, at 778.
9  r. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Friday July 7, 1995, Office of the spokesman 
(Nov. 10, 2019) available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9507/950707db.
html.
10  deeks 2012, at 520.
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should explore whether there is an opportunity to work cooperatively with the 
territorial state to suppress terrorism, thus reducing the number of possible cases 
in which a victim state uses force unilaterally in the territorial state.11
Nevertheless, the u.s.-led military intervention in syria seems far from compatible 
with the normative elements of the “unwilling or unable” test since they failed to 
obtain any consent or cooperation from the syrian government.
the syrian government’s “unwillingness or inability” to suppress isiL invoked by 
the u.s. as a legal justification for their military intervention does not seem to be very 
convincing. the syrian governmental army has been taking necessary measures to fight 
against isiL since isiL seized control of some parts of syrian territory and the government 
even requested other states for assistance in their fight against terrorism.12
it is true that the syrian government has not yet succeeded in eradicating isiL, 
but it cannot be accused of having been unwilling or unable to deal with isiL. those 
undisputed proofs can be found in various sources, such as the reports made by 
the secretary General.13
Nevertheless, according to the u.s. legal reasoning, the failure of the syrian 
government to eradicate isiL, i.e. syrian “objective inability” allegedly grants the u.s. 
and other intervening states a right to use force unilaterally in the syrian territory.
the aim of this study is to assess whether the military intervention on the basis 
of the “unwilling or unable” test in syria is in conformity with international law. 
A consensus on the issue of military interventions on the basis of the “unwilling or 
unable” test has not yet been reached. some scholars, like Gareth williams, contended 
that the test is an emerging norm of customary international law,14 while others, like 
11 deeks 2012, at 533.
12  For example, see u.N. security Council, security Council Meeting on the situation Concerning iraq, 
19 september 2014, s/Pv.7271, at 43; u.N. security Council, security Council Meeting on threats to 
international Peace and security caused by terrorist Acts, 19 November 2014, s/Pv.7316, at 33; u.N. 
General Assembly, security Council, identical letters dated 26 February 2015 from the Permanent 
representative of the syrian Arab republic to the united Nations addressed to the secretary-General 
and the President of the security Council, 3 March 2015, A/69/804–s/2015/152; u.N. General Assembly, 
security Council, identical letters dated 25 May 2015 from the Permanent representative of the 
syrian Arab republic to the united Nations addressed to the secretary-General and the President of 
the security Council, 1 June 2015, A/69/912–s/2015/371.
13  u.N. security Council, report of the secretary-General on the implementation of security Council 
resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014), 24 september 2014, s/2014/696, at 6; u.N. security Council, 
report of the secretary-General on the implementation of security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 
2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014), 23 March 2015, s/2015/206, at 13; u.N. security Council, report of the 
secretary-General on the implementation of security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) 
and 2191 (2014), 17 April 2015, s/2015/264, at 4; u.N. security Council, report of the secretary-General on 
the implementation of security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014), 22 May 
2015, s/2015/368, at 4; u.N. security Council, report of the secretary-General on the implementation of 
security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014), 23 July 2015, s/2015/561, at 4.
14  Gareth d. williams, Piercing the Shield of Sovereignty: An Assessment of the Legal Status of the “Unwilling 
or Unable” Test, 36(2) university of New south wales Law Journal 619 (2013).
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Olivier Corten concluded that if we accept the test, every state would be allowed to 
launch a military campaign on another state’s territory, which would lead to a radical 
change, if not to the end, of the u.N. system.15
the present article focuses on investigating whether the “unwilling or unable” 
test is in conformity with both customary international law and international treaties. 
the article investigates the legality of the test in terms of state practice and opinio 
juris, which are the universally recognized elements of customary international law 
(section 1) and in terms of the principles of respect for sovereignty, non-use of 
force, circumstances precluding wrongfulness, and self-defense recognized under 
international treaties (section 2).
unless accurate legal solution to the problem of military intervention justified 
by the “unwilling or unable” test is provided, the present system of international 
law, including non-use of force regime would be in the throes of crisis. Admittedly, 
a state cannot be denied a right to defend itself against attacks or threats posed by 
non-state actors, including international terrorist groups, but it is equally right and 
proper that such act in self-defense must not lead to any violations of sovereignty 
of a territorial state where a non-state actor operates from.
therefore, the present article highlights the problem of sovereignty violation in 
the analysis of military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test, 
thus attempting to contribute to alleviating the throes of crisis which the present 
use of force regime faces.
section 1 will argue that no universal and consistent state practice or opinio juris 
exists to corroborate the assertion that the “unwilling or unable” test has emerged as 
a norm of customary international law. section 2 will show that the “unwilling or unable” 
test as invoked by the u.s. in the syrian case is incompatible with rules of international 
law, including Chapter ii of the u.N. Charter that regulated respect for sovereignty and 
non-use of force, and its exceptions, namely self-defense and consent as circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness. section 3 will provide concluding remarks.
the sources cited in the research include academic literature, articles, reports, 
and government statements, etc.
1. The “Unwilling or Unable” Test and Military Intervention in Syria:  
Customary International Law
According to those in favor of the “unwilling or unable” test in justifying military inter-
ventions, the test has emerged as a new principle of customary international law.
Customary international law is defined as international law that derives from the 
practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding.16 Paragraph 1 of Article 38 
15  Corten 2016, at 77.
16  Black’s Law Dictionary (B.A. Garner (ed.), 9th ed., st. Paul: west, 2009).
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of the statute of the international Court of Justice (iCJ) defines customary international 
law as “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” in 
order for international custom to be formed, two elements are required: state practice 
and opinio juris. Although the two-element approach is not without controversies, it 
is mainly recognized by the international community. One of the typical precedents 
that endorsed the two-element approach is the judgment of the international Court 
of Justice on the 1960 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory.17 there 
are several other precedents of the iCJ and the Permanent Court of international 
Justice concerning the requirements for the formation of customary international law. 
the two-element approach has been applied by many of those who argue that the 
“unwilling or unable” test has emerged as customary international law.
As is known, the “unwilling or unable” test has never been specified in any of the 
international legal documents or judicial precedents; it only exists as an academic 
theory. unlike other customary rules of international law like the principle concerning 
free use of outer space, the “unwilling or unable” test has not been universally 
recognized by all states. Nevertheless, some international publicists argue that the 
test has already emerged as a customary international law since state practice and 
opinio juris in favor of the test exist.
the following sections will investigate whether there exist state practice and 
opinio juris concerning the “unwilling or unable” test.
1.1. Non-Existence of State Practice
According to some scholars, the “unwilling or unable” test reflects a practice in 
which some states crossed the boundaries of other states that were accused of being 
unable to prevent terrorist groups from using their territories as “safe havens” for 
launching attacks against the intervening states.18
state practice refers to activities that are usually or regularly done by states, often 
as a tradition or custom. in order for a certain activity to become state practice and to 
be recognized as an element required for the formation of customary international 
law, it should be general and consistent. in other words, a certain state conduct should 
be carried out not by a handful of states, but by an overwhelming majority of states 
and not temporarily, but consistently and repeatedly in order for it to amount to state 
practice. this was adopted in the decisions of international courts and tribunals and 
widely endorsed in the literature.19
the important problem herein is exactly how many states must carry out a certain 
practice in order for it to be general and how long a certain practice must exist in 
17  Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) (1960) i.C.J. 6.
18  deeks 2012, at 502.
19  international Law Commission, second report on identification of Customary international Law 
(prepared by special rapporteur Michael wood), 22 May 2014, A/CN.4/672, para. 21.
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order to be consistent. there is no specific legal requirement for this, but there exist 
an academic approach that is universally recognized.
As for the generality of a certain practice, it is recognized that a practice is general if 
it is followed by an overwhelming majority of states, which have had the opportunity of 
applying the practice, which leads to the formation of a rule of customary international 
law. As for the consistency of a practice, it is accepted that although repetition of 
a certain conduct for hundreds of years had been required in the past, decades or 
several years of repetition may lead to the formation of a certain practice at the 
present time. For example, although the principle on free use of the high seas has 
been observed by several states since 17th century, it was not until the 19th century 
that it became state practice. By contrast, the law of freedom of movement in outer 
space was recognized as a rule of customary international law after only a few years 
of practice.20
As for the military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test, the 
same conduct must be repeatedly followed by an overwhelming majority of states, 
which have had the opportunity of applying the test, in order for the relevant state 
practice to be formed. such states include those which have been, are or can be the 
subjects of attack by a non-state actor. states without non-state actors operating 
across boundaries or have well-functioning security cooperation with neighboring 
states seldom need to apply the test. the application of the “unwilling or unable” test 
is mainly relevant to those states facing political or military instability, or civil strife 
and that are under direct or indirect threat of attack posed by non-state actors.
in fact, it is difficult to determine exactly how many states will have the 
opportunity to invoke the test, since which states will be under attack by non-state 
actors is unpredictable.
But it is not impossible to decide which states have had the opportunity of applying 
the test. As mentioned above, the approach similar to the present “unwilling or unable” 
test was proposed in 1970s, so it can be said that the states that carried out military 
interventions after the 1970s have had the opportunity of applying the “unwilling 
or unable” test. such cases include the u.s. intervention against Cambodia in 1970, 
turkish military attack against kurds in northern iraq of 1995, rwandan and ugandan 
use of force in the democratic republic of Congo in 1997, alleged russian action 
against Chechen separatists in Georgia in 2002, Columbian military attack against 
ecuador in 2008, and airstrikes by u.s.-led coalition against isiL in syria in 2014.21 But 
the limited space of the article does not permit detailed analysis of all relevant cases. 
some of the most typical cases are analyzed in this article to assess the applicability 
of the “unwilling or unable” test.
20  katherine N. Guernsey, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 27(1) Ohio Northern university Law 
review 141, 150 (2000–01).
21  Anton Larsson, The Right of States to Use Force Against Non-State Actors – Is the “Unwilling or Unable” Test Custo-
mary International Law?, thesis in Public international Law, Faculty of Law, stockholm university (2015), at 
16–38 (Nov. 10, 2019) available at http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:854914/FuLLteXt01.pdf.
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Among six states which have had the opportunity of applying the test, including 
the u.s., turkey, russia, uganda, rwanda, and Columbia, only three of the states 
explicitly referred to the “unwilling or unable” test: turkey in 1996, russia in 2002, and 
the u.s. in 1970 and 2014.22 however, russia invoked the “unwilling or unable” test 
but managed to reach an agreement of cooperation with the Georgian government 
before resorting to the use of force.23 thus, russia, which have had the opportunity 
of applying the “unwilling or unable” test, but not actually applied it, is excluded in 
the list of states that have applied the test in practice. in light of this, a handful of 
states that do not constitute even a simple majority have applied the test.
international practice after 2006, when the “unwilling or unable” test was relatively 
well-defined, particularly indicates that the majority of states which have had the 
opportunity of applying the test did not apply the test in practice.
the states which have recently had the opportunity of applying the test include the 
states that took part in the u.s.-led coalition acting in iraq and syria since 2014. Military 
action in iraq is clearly undisputable and the “unwilling or unable” test cannot be applied 
hereto since it is based on invitation and consent of the iraqi government.
On the other hand, although syria invited russia and iraq to carry out military 
interventions against isiL in its territory, the government did not invite or consent the 
u.s.-led coalition to intervene. therefore, the states participating in the coalition can be 
considered as the states which have the most probable opportunity of applying the 
test. Among those states, only four: the u.s.,24 Canada,25 Australia,26 and turkey27 invoked 
the “unwilling or unable” test. these states justified that they acted in conformity with 
the “unwilling or unable” test in syria in the letters sent to the united Nations and in 
a number of meetings held in the u.N. it is interesting to note that, inter alia, Canada 
and Australia opposed the invocation of the test at first, but then shifted their position 
to support the justification on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test.
what transpires is that a general and consistent state practice does not exist 
concerning military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test and 
accordingly, it can be concluded that no relevant rule of customary international 
law has formed.
22 Larsson, supra note 21, at 40.
23  Id.
24  Letter dated 23 september 2014, supra note 3.
25  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 31 March 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission 
of Canada to the united Nations addressed to the President of the security Council, 31 March 2015, 
s/2015/221.
26  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 9 september 2015 from the Permanent representative of Australia to 
the united Nations addressed to the President of the security Council, 9 september 2015, s/2015/693.
27  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 24 July 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of 
turkey to the united Nations addressed to the President of the security Council, 24 July 2015, s/2015/563; 
see also u.N. security Council, Letter dated 14 June 2015 from the Permanent representative of turkey 
to the united Nations addressed to the President of the security Council, 15 June 2015, s/2015/434.
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1.2. Non-Existence of Opinio Juris
For a rule of customary international law to be formed, opinio juris, a subjective 
element must exist as well as state practice, which is an objective element. Opinio juris is 
the principle that for conduct or a practice to become a rule of customary international 
law, it must be shown that nations believe that international law (rather than moral 
obligation) mandates the conduct or practice.28 Opinio juris constitutes one of the two 
fundamental elements required for the formation of customary international law.
An opinio juris is established when the majority of states believe that a certain 
practice is mandatory under international law through repeated application of the 
practice. this immediately raises an important problem concerning the sources of 
evidence that must be relied upon to determine the existence or non-existence of 
opinio juris.
the international Law Commission (iLC) opined that opinio juris can be inferred 
from practice,29 but went further to enumerate several other materials in which 
evidence of opinio juris may be found.30 Besides clear statements by a state, the 
iLC emphasizes that intergovernmental correspondence, the jurisprudence of 
national courts, the opinions of government legal advisors, official publications 
in fields of international law, internal memoranda by state officials, treaties (and 
their travaux préparatoires) and resolutions of deliberative organs of international 
organizations, such as the General Assembly and security Council of the united 
Nations, and resolutions of international conferences can be the sources of evidence 
for determining the existence of opinio juris.
in fact, since the behavior of states analyzed in subsection 1.1 do not demonstrate 
the existence of general and consistent state practice in favor of the “unwilling or 
unable” test, similar conclusion can be drawn as to opinio juris. however, assuming 
that some scholars argue that state practice in favor of the test has already been 
established, it is necessary to reassess the presence of opinio juris in favor of the test 
in terms of the above-listed sources of evidence.
the analysis focuses mainly on the states that are closely involved with the 
“unwilling or unable” test as well as other states. this is because the former group 
of states has more urgent needs to declare their opinio juris concerning the “unwilling 
or unable” test. such states include those states participating in the u.s.-led coalition 
in the syrian territory.
As mentioned earlier, besides 15 states in the u.s.-led coalition, russia and iran 
are undertaking intervention in syria. 18 states, including syria, the territorial state, 
are involved with the application of the test. it will be determined which (group of ) 
states accepted or refused the test below.
28  Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 16, at 1201.
29  second report on identification of Customary international Law, supra note 19, para. 7.
30  Id. para. 76.
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First, a substantial number of participants of the u.s.-led coalition never referred 
to the “unwilling or unable” test except only four which have explicitly invoked the 
“unwilling or unable” test: the u.s., Canada, Australia, and turkey.
Germany merely implied the test but not expressed conviction in favor of the 
test, contending that
the Government of the syrian Arab republic does not at this time exercise 
effective control. states that have been subjected to armed attack by isiL 
originating in this part of syrian territory, are therefore justified under Article 51 
of the Charter of the united Nations to take necessary measures of self-
defense...31
the uk and France never invoked the “unwilling or unable” test as a legal basis 
for their attacks. the uk invoked collective and individual self-defense without 
explicitly invoking the “unwilling or unable” test as a legal ground for their military 
intervention in syria. in a letter sent to the security Council in November 2014, the 
uk referred to collective self-defense according to Article 51,32 in the second letter 
sent in september 2015, it referred to individual self-defense,33 and in the third letter 
sent in december, it referred to “individual and collective self-defense” in relation to 
security Council resolution 2249 (2015).34
in the same vein, after having abstained from using force in the syrian territory, 
France suddenly shifted its position to participate in the military intervention in syria 
since september 2015 without providing any legal reasoning. it simply stated that 
in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the united Nations, France has taken 
actions involving the participation of military aircraft in response to attacks carried 
out by isiL from the territory of the syrian Arab republic.35
31  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 10 december 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of Germany to the united Nations addressed to the President of the security Council, 
10 december 2015, s/2015/946.
32  u.N. security Council, identical letters dated 25 November 2014 from the Permanent representative 
of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Northern ireland to the united Nations addressed to the 
secretary-General and the President of the security Council, 26 November 2014, s/2014/851.
33  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 7 september 2015 from the Permanent representative of the united 
kingdom of Great Britain and Northern ireland to the united Nations addressed to the President of 
the security Council, 8 september 2015, s/2015/688.
34  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 3 december 2015 from the Permanent representative of the united 
kingdom of Great Britain and Northern ireland to the united Nations addressed to the President of 
the security Council, 3 december 2015, s/2015/928.
35  u.N. security Council, identical letters dated 8 september 2015 from the Permanent representative 
of France to the united Nations addressed to the secretary-General and the President of the security 
Council, 9 september 2015, s/2015/745. No legal precision was brought in the following months. 
déclaration du gouvernement sur l’engagement des forces aériennes – intervention de Laurent 
Fabius au sénat, 15 september 2015 (Nov. 10, 2019) available at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/z_
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what is more important is that the Arab states, which account for a considerable 
number of the states participating in the coalition, refused to support the “unwilling 
or unable” test. After beginning their military intervention on the syrian territory, 
those states did not send any report to the security Council, as required by Article 51 
of the u.N. Charter.36 Prior to military intervention on the syrian territory, Arab states 
had strongly condemned turkish incursion into iraqi territory invocation of self-
defense on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test and requested immediate 
withdrawal of turkish force in June 2015. this clearly indicates the position of Arab 
states concerning the “unwilling or unable” test.
second, other intervening states, including russia and iran, which were invited by 
the syrian government to undertake military intervention, denounced the illegality 
of any unilateral action against syria. the fact that russia condemned “strikes of 
the u.s. armed forces against isiL in syria without the consent of the legitimate 
government” as “an act of aggression, a gross violation of international law,”37 clearly 
indicates absence of russian legal conviction in favor of the test. the same opposition 
can be observed in the iranian position. it should also be mentioned that, syria, 
the territorial state, strongly denounced the actions of the u.s.-led coalition as 
infringement upon the syrian territory.
what can be inferred from the foregoing is that the majority of states involved 
in the military intervention in syria do not support the test.
Military intervention justified under the “unwilling or unable” test was not 
accepted by the majority of international community. Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, 
Brazil, Chad, China, Cuba, the dPrk, ecuador, india, iran, venezuela, south Africa, 
and AseAN states declared their positions rejecting any attempts to undermine the 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of syria, thus strongly denounced 
unilateral military intervention and its justification, the “unwilling or unable” test.38
in addition, the “unwilling or unable” test is not supported by international 
organizations, such as the united Nations. the security Council of the united 
Nations is an international organ whose primary responsibility is maintenance 
of international peace and security, and it is the fundamental requirement of the 
present international security system that use of force should be authorized by the 
security Council. therefore, military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or 
unable” test must be, at least, acquiesced by the security Council.
archives/fr/anciens-ministres-old/laurent-fabius/discours/article/declaration-du-gouvernement-sur-
l-engagement-des-forces-aeriennes-intervention. See also u.N. security Council, security Council 
Meeting on threats to international Peace and security caused by terrorist Acts, 20 November 2015, 
s/Pv.7565, at 2.
36  Corten 2016, at 783.
37  russia says Air strikes in syria would Be Act of Aggression without u.N. vote, reuters, 11 september 
2014 (Nov. 10, 2019) available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-u-s-syria-airstrikes/russia-
says-air-strikes-in-syria-would-be-act-of-aggression-without-u-n-vote-idukkBN0h61BF20140911.
38  Corten 2016, at 788–789.
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Nevertheless, exhaustive reading of security Council resolution and declarations 
concerning the syrian case indicate that no reference was made to the “unwilling or 
unable” test. the security Council reaffirmed its respect for state sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and political independence and called upon member states to cooperate 
and consistently support each other’s efforts to counter terrorism.39 this shows that 
the security Council does not support unilateral military intervention or use of force 
on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test as invoked in the syrian case.
Lack of opinio juris of the international community is corroborated in relevant 
academic literature. A book entitled “self-defence Against Non-state Actors: impulses 
from the Max Planck trialogues on the Law of Peace and war” published by the Max 
Planck institute for Comparative Public Law and international Law in 2017 covers 
different positions of scholars concerning the “unwilling or unable” test and self-
defense. the articles were classified under four categories: restrictive positions, 
expansionist positions, conceptual alternatives, and meta questions. Among the 
articles edited in the book, eight were restrictive, challenging the “unwilling or unable” 
test, five were expansionist, supporting the test, and two articles took rather eclectic 
positions.40 As a whole, the test was not accepted by the majority of the scholars 
whose articles were included in the book.
the foregoing suggests that the “unwilling or unable” test, on the basis of which 
unilateral military intervention is carried out, has not obtained opinio juris from the 
majority of states, thus not qualifying as an emerging rule of customary international 
law.
2. The “Unwilling or Unable” Test and Military Intervention in Syria: 
International Convention
the united Nations Charter is the most authoritative instrument under which 
the legality or illegality of military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or 
unable” test can be judged. the Charter, which was written with vivid memory of 
the First world war and with the second world war still raging, is the fundamental 
legal document that comprehensively regulates rights and obligations of states, 
including non-use of force.
Article 2.1 of the u.N. Charter specifies sovereign equality as the most important 
principle for the maintenance of international peace and security, and to that end 
Article 2.4 prohibited threat or use of force. the exceptions to the prohibition are 
regulated in Chapter vii (authorization of the security Council) and Article 51 (self-
defense).
39 Corten 2016, at 789–790.
40  Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: Impulses from the Max Planck Trialogues on the Law of Peace 
and War (A. Peters & C. Marxsen (eds.), Berlin: Max Planck institute for Comparative Public Law and 
international Law, 2017).
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Provisions on non-use of force and its exceptions were further itemized in draft 
Articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful Acts (ArsiwA) that 
was adopted in November 2001. Articles 20 and 21 of ArsiwA specify consent and 
self-defense as circumstances precluding wrongfulness. ArsiwA can also be used 
as an important source for deciding the legality of unilateral military intervention 
on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test.
For military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test to be legal, 
it must be compatible with exceptions of non-use of force that are enshrined in 
international legal instruments, including the u.N. Charter and ArsiwA.
since military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test amounts 
to use of force, it clearly falls into the range of application of Article 2.4. therefore, 
only when such intervention is held compatible with exceptions of non-use of force – 
authorization of the security Council, consent, and self-defense – can it be deemed 
legal.
in case of intervention by authorization of the security Council, intervening states 
do not need to invoke the “unwilling or unable” test and the security Council has 
never authorized any states to intervene in syria, so the first item can be excluded 
from further analysis.
in practice, those who support the “unwilling or unable” test as proposed by the 
u.s. in the syrian case, provides two legal reasoning: one is passive consent, which 
is a variety of consent, and the other is self-defense.
subsections 2.1 and 2.2 will explore whether military intervention on the basis of 
the “unwilling or unable” test is compatible with exceptions of use of force: consent 
and self-defense.
2.1. Consent as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness
Article 20 of ArsiwA reads that
[v]alid consent by a state to the commission of a given act by another 
state precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former state 
to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.
According to this provision, consent can be recognized as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness when two requirements are met. First, the consent must 
be valid, and second, the act must not exceed the limits of that consent. what is 
fundamental to the validity requirement of consent is the method of giving consent. 
this is because determining whether or not a relevant act remains within the limits 
of that consent depends on the method of consent.
however, Article 20 of ArsiwA simply provides the term “valid” without specifying 
detailed methods for granting consent. in this light, the iLC emphasized that
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consent must be freely given and clearly established. it must be actually 
expressed by the state rather than merely presumed on the basis that the 
state would have consented if it had been asked.41
it can be concluded, therefore, that the valid method of consent, a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness, should be an express and free one without any elements 
of fraud, coercion, or threat.
what is of paramount importance in the method of consent is that consent must 
be expressly stated. Consent that is not expressed by a state cannot be recognized 
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, regardless of whether it is freely given 
or coerced.
Nevertheless, the military intervention in syria was carried out by the u.s.-led 
coalition even without tacit or implied consent, not to speak of any express written 
consent from the syrian government.
As mentioned earlier, strikes of the u.s.-led coalition against isiL on the syrian 
territory commenced on 22 september 2014. the following ten states were reported 
to have participated in the u.s.-led airstrikes in syria until early February 2016: the 
u.s., Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Jordan, saudi Arabia, turkey, the uAe, and 
the uk.42 Later, the number of participants increased to fifteen as five more states – 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, denmark, and Morocco – joined the coalition.43 
Among these participants, no state has ever asked or obtained express consent 
from the syrian government.
For political reasons, not only the u.s. but also all other member states are hostile 
to the syrian government, regarding it as illegitimate and asking for the departure of 
Bashar al-Assad government. Consequently, consent has never been asked from syria. 
this was endorsed by the statement of the u.s. state department that clearly indicated 
that the u.s.-led coalition was “not looking for the approval of the syrian regime”44 and 
constantly ruled out any cooperation with the syrian government forces.45
41  united Nations, draft Articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries (2001), at 73, para. 6 (Nov. 10, 2019) available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. this is consistent with the previous position of the Commission 
according to which consent, in order to produce any legal effects, must be “valid in international law, 
clearly established, really expressed (which precludes merely presumed consent), internationally attributable 
to the State and anterior to the commission of the act to which it refers.” Document A/34/10: Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-first session (14 May – 3 August 1979) in Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 1979. Vol. II (Part Two) 112 (New york: united Nations, 1980) (Nov. 10, 
2019) also available at https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1979_v2_p2.pdf.
42  Bannelier-Christakis 2016, at 766.
43  Corten 2016, at 780.
44  Justin sink, White House Won’t Commit to Asking Congress for Syria Strike, the hill, 25 August 2014 
(Nov. 10, 2019) available at thehill.com/policy/defense/215905-white-house-wont-commit-to-asking-
congress-for-syria-strike.
45  Anne Gearan, U.S. Rules out Coordinating with Assad on Airstrikes Against Islamists in Syria, washington 
Post, 26 August 2014 (Nov. 10, 2019) available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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since airstrikes of the u.s.-led coalition were not carried out under the consent 
of the syrian government, it is definitely in violation of international law. Not long 
after the initiation of airstrikes, intervening states advanced the theory of “passive 
consent” as a legal justification for their use of force.
According to the “passive consent” theory, the syrian government was not 
opposed to the strikes of the u.s.-led-coalition against isiL considering it as a relief 
for the government forces,46 which amounts to the alleged “passive consent” from 
the syrian government.
the alleged “passivity” of the syrian government can be disputed in view of its 
strong denouncement with respect to the airstrikes of the u.s.-led coalition in its 
own territory. when the u.s. President Barack Obama announced his intention to 
bomb isiL targets in syria on 10 september 2014, the government strongly reacted, 
declaring that “any action of any kind without the consent of the syrian government 
would be an attack on syria”47 russia and iran also declared that “strikes by the us 
armed forces against isiL positions in syria without the consent of the legitimate 
government” will be, “an act of aggression, a gross violation of international law.”48
the foregoing suggests that the “passive consent” approach as a legal justification 
for military intervention lacks evidence.
the supporters of the “passive consent” approach contend that the passivity of 
the syrian government for several months after the airstrikes began shows that the 
government was not opposed to the strikes of the u.s.-led coalition against isiL. 
what they relied upon to support the “passive consent” approach is silence and 
ambiguous expression of the syrian position stated, for example, in the letter sent 
to the security Council in June 2015 reading “it is prepared to cooperate bilaterally 
and at the regional and international levels to combat terrorism” and that
it supports any genuine international effort aimed at countering the 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, provided that, in doing so, every 
effort is made to safeguard civilian lives, respect national sovereignty and 
adhere to international infringements.49
the immediate question then arises concerning whether silence or ambiguity 
amount to “passive consent” for a military intervention and further equivalent to 
valid consent, thus justifying intervention under international law.
security/us-rules-out-coordinating-with-assad-on-airstrikes-against-islamists-in-syria/2014/08/26/
cda02e0e-2d2e-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.html.
46  identical letters dated 25 May 2015, supra note 12.
47  ian Black & dan roberts, Isis Air Strikes: Obama’s Plan Condemned by Syria, Russia and Iran, the Guardian, 
12 september 2014 (Nov. 10, 2019) available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/11/
assad-moscow-tehran-condemn-obama-isis-air-strike-plan.
48  Id.
49  identical letters dated 25 May 2015, supra note 12.
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“Action versus reaction” paradigm is of great importance in international legal 
relations. As a legal maxim qui tacet, consentire videtur indicates, silence, tolerance, and 
non-opposition cannot be entirely ignored in international relations. inactive response 
or silence, however, cannot be recognized as consent. if it is accepted in a use of force 
regime, it would be abused, resulting in continuous military intervention and use of 
force against other states under the pretext of “passive consent” or “tacit consent.”
it is for this reason that the u.N. General Assembly resolution 3314 on the defi-
nition of Aggression stated that an act of aggression may consist of
[t]he use of armed forces of one state which are within the territory of 
another state with the agreement of the receiving state, in contravention 
of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their 
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement.50
According to this paragraph, there seems to be little room for military activities 
or even presence of foreign troops in the territorial state without requiring express 
consent from the territorial state.
what transpires is that the “passive consent” approach advanced by some inter-
vening states as a legal justification for military intervention in syria is hardly compatible 
with the u.N. General Assembly resolution 3314 on the definition of Aggression.
the theory of “passive consent” seems to have become inapplicable after syria 
sent a letter to the security Council concerning military intervention carried out 
by the u.s.-led coalition on 17 september 2015. in the letter, syria stated that the 
intervening states:
invoke[d] a distorted reading of the intention of Article 51 of the Charter 
of the united Nations … syria has not made any request to that effect. … if 
any state invokes the excuse of counter-terrorism in order to be present on 
syrian territory without the consent of the syrian Government, whether on the 
country’s land or in its airspace or territorial waters, its actions shall be considered 
a violation of syrian sovereignty. Combating terrorism on syrian territory requires 
close cooperation and coordination with the syrian Government in accordance 
with the counter-terrorism resolutions of the security Council.51
thus, it clearly denounced military intervention by the u.s.-led coalition as illegal 
under international law. Later, it even stated that
50  u.N. General Assembly, definition of Aggression, 14 december 1974, A/res/29/3314, para. 3(e).
51  u.N. security Council, identical letters dated 17 september 2015 from the Permanent representative of 
the syrian Arab republic to the united Nations addressed to the secretary-General and the President 
of the security Council, 21 september 2015, s/2015/719.
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[t]he united states, Britain, France, Canada and Australia have sought to 
justify their intervention in syria by citing the fight against isiL. they have 
invoked Article 51 of the Charter of the united Nations, but have not consulted 
with the syrian Government. that course of action distorts the provisions of 
the Charter and manipulates international law.52
in subsequent letters, syria showed its opposition to airstrikes and legal justification 
invoked by the u.s.-led coalition even more clearly, calling it as a flagrant violation of 
its national sovereignty and international law. in december 2015, for instance, syria 
sent a letter protesting that
aircrafts of the so-called international coalition led by the united states 
of America continue to violate the sovereignty of syria under the pretext 
that they are targeting the islamic state in iraq and the Levant (isiL) terrorist 
organization.53
while denouncing military intervention by the u.s.-led coalition without any 
invitation or consent as futile and hypocritical, the syrian government invited russia 
and iran to assist in its effort to defeat terrorism and waged large-scale military 
actions against isiL.
the russian military intervention in syria is based on invitation by the syrian 
government. in a letter sent to the security Council on 15 October 2016, russia 
stated that
in response to a request from the President of the syrian Arab republic, 
Bashar al-Assad, to provide military assistance in combating the terrorist 
group islamic state in iraq and the Levant (isiL) and other terrorist groups 
operating in syria, the russian Federation began launching air and missile 
strikes against the assets of terrorist formations in the territory of the syrian 
Arab republic on 30 september 2015.54
since russia launched strikes against isiL in syria, the syrian government have 
been calling other states to “respect international law” as russia, and expanded its 
52  u.N. General Assembly, security Council, identical letters dated 21 september 2015 from the Permanent 
representative of the syrian Arab republic to the united Nations addressed to the secretary-General 
and the President of the security Council, 22 september 2015, A/70/385–s/2015/727.
53  u.N. security Council, identical letters dated 9 November 2015 from the Permanent representative of 
the syrian Arab republic to the united Nations addressed to the secretary-General and the President 
of the security Council, 16 November 2015, s/2015/851.
54  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 15 October 2015 from the Permanent representative of the russian 
Federation to the united Nations addressed to the President of the security Council, 15 October 2015, 
s/2015/792.
HUI-CHOL PAK, HYE-RYON SON 91
operations to annihilate isiL under the assistance of russian force. As of september 
2018, the government forces liberated approximately 1400 civilian areas from the 
control of terrorists and seized control of over 96% of its territory.
unlike the syrian case, military intervention by the u.s.-led coalition in iraq was 
never challenged since it is based on an invitation of the iraqi government. when isiL 
captured some important areas in iraq, including Mosul in 2014, the iraqi government 
issued requests for “the assistance of the international community” to help “defeat 
isiL and protect our territory and people” from the growing threat posed by this 
terrorist organization.55 in response to this call, a u.s.-led coalition, consisting of nine 
participants (the u.s., Australia, Belgium, Canada, denmark, France, Jordan, the 
Netherlands, and the uk)56 started airstrikes against isiL in iraq.
the iraqi government’s invitation for assistance of the international community 
to defeat isiL was affirmed in a letter sent to the President of the security Council in 
september 2014, in which iraq emphasized that
in accordance with international law and the relevant bilateral and multila-
teral agreements, and with due regard for complete national sovereignty 
and the Constitution, we have requested the united states of America to 
lead international efforts to strike isiL sites and military strongholds, with 
our express consent.57
iraq has clearly affirmed several times that the airstrikes by the u.s.-led coalition 
were taking place on the basis of its express consent.58 the iraqi government has 
also authorized some other states, such as iran, besides the u.s.-led coalition to 
intervene on its territory. No state raised any objections about the legality of such 
intervention.59
As military intervention on iraqi territory is based on express request of the govern-
ment to help defeat isiL, an international terrorist group, but not to repress political 
rebels in a civil strife, it was never challenged by international community.
unlike intervention on iraqi territory, intervention by the u.s.-led coalition in syria 
is not accepted by international community and raises strong opposition since it 
was launched without any consent from the territorial state, syria.
55  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent representative of iraq to the 
united Nations addressed to the secretary-General, 25 June 2014, s/2014/440.
56  See Operation inherent resolve: targeted Operations to defeat isis, u.s. department of defense (Nov. 10, 
2019) available at www.defense.gov/News/special-reports/0814_inherent-resolve.
57  u.N. security Council, Letter dated 20 september 2014 from the Permanent representative of iraq to 
the united Nations addressed to President of the uNsC, 22 september 2014, s/2014/691.
58  Bannelier-Christakis 2016, at 751.
59  Id.
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2.2. Exercise of a Right of Self-Defense
the majority of states participating in military intervention in syria to riposte 
isiL invoked individual and collective self-defense or “Preventive” self-defense. As 
mentioned earlier, the u.s. invoked inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the u.N. Charter. turkey also invoked its inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defense since
the regime in syria is neither capable nor willing to prevent these [isiL] 
threats emanating from its territory which clearly imperil the security of 
turkey and safety of its nationals.60
similar positions were taken by the uk and France.
whether the legal reasoning that the “unwillingness or inability” of syria to defeat 
isiL allows states concerned to exercise individual and collective self-defense or 
“Preventive” self-defense is compatible with international law or not can be determined 
by analyzing it in respect of provisions on self-defense under the u.N. Charter and 
ArsiwA.
self-defense is a right of a state to defend itself against a real or threatened 
attack.61 self-defense, which is an exception to Article 2.4 that prohibits use of force, 
is specified in Article 51 of the u.N. Charter and ArsiwA. Article 51 of the u.N. Charter 
recognizes that a state has an inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against the state, and Article 21 of ArsiwA regulates that the 
wrongfulness of an act of a state is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measures 
of self-defense taken in conformity with the Charter of the united Nations. According 
to these provisions, a state can exercise individual or collective self-defense when 
armed attack against itself occurs, and use of force in self-defense is a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness.
Application of these two provisions to military intervention on the basis of the 
“unwilling or unable” test in syria raises several questions to be addressed.
the first question is whether self-defense can be applied to a victim state vis-à-
vis a non-state actor within a territorial state. since the conductor of an armed attack 
in the “unwilling or unable” test is a non-state actor acting within the territory of 
a territorial state, the subject of self-defense by a victim state is the non-state actor. 
international law, however, confines the subject of self-defense to be a state. self-
defense regulated under international law, including the u.N. Charter and ArsiwA 
includes an individual right of an aggressed state or collective right of its allies vis-à-
vis an aggressor state. Article 2.4 prohibits states from using force and self-defense, 
which is an exception to this prohibition, is also applicable only to states.
60  Letter dated 24 July 2015, supra note 27.
61  Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 16, at 1510.
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the “unwilling or unable” test, according to which non-state actors can be the 
subjects of self-defense, is based on a distorted assumption that Article 51 can be 
applied to non-state actors, an assumption that has never been recognized in the 
relevant texts62 and case-law.63
if self-defense is to be applied to non-state actors, it would necessarily accompany 
violation of sovereignty of a territorial state. this would, in turn, lead to military 
reactions of the territorial state, which considers such armed attack against non-state 
actors as invasion of its own territory. then it would subsequently result in an ill-
cycle of retaliation under the name of “aggression” and “self-defense” in international 
relations.
the syrian case is a typical example. the syrian government denounced military 
intervention by the u.s.-led coalition on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test as 
a blatant violation of its sovereignty and an act of aggression.
in the present situation where non-state actors under different names, which 
are capable of conducting armed attacks, exist in different countries of the world, 
if the “unwilling or unable” test is accepted, unilateral military intervention would 
be commonplace anytime, anywhere. this would eventually lead to the collapse of 
international legal system concerning jus contra bellum and non-use of force. this 
seems to challenge the “unwilling or unable” test.
then the question arises concerning who should be held responsible for armed 
attacks of non-state actors such as isiL, and what should be done about it.
self-defense, in a strict technical sense, concerns the relationship between two 
subjects: the aggressor and the aggressed. therefore, military actions in self-defense 
can be properly addressed when which state should be held responsible for attacks 
of the non-state actor, namely isiL is decided. it can be determined by analyzing the 
issue under ArsiwA that regulates attribution of a conduct to a state.
According to ArsiwA, attribution takes place on the basis of an institutional, 
a functional and an agency test.64 the institutional test concerns the attribution of 
an attack to a state if it has been committed by a de jure or de facto organ of that 
state.65 According to the functional test, an attack is attributed to a state if it has been 
62  Art. 1 of the definition of Aggression, supra note 50, referring to the use of force by one state against 
another state. this inter-state criterion was reaffirmed in 2010 when the crime of aggression was 
defined at the kampala Conference. the definition refers to resolution 3314 (XXiX) and expressly 
requires that the author of the crime of aggression must be a state organ, excluding the prosecution 
against individuals leading a non-state group.
63  Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (2004) i.C.J. 136, 194, para. 139. See Paulina starski, Right to Self-Defense, Attribution and the 
Non-State Actor: Birth of the “Unable or Unwilling” Standard?, 75 Zaörv 455 (2015).
64  kristen e. Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in Attribution Doctrines, 15(2) 
Melbourne Journal of international Law 329 (2014).
65  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America) (1986) i.C.J. 14, para. 109.
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committed by an entity that is empowered by that state to exercise governmental 
authority or is committed by an organ of another state that has been placed at the 
disposal of the first state.66 Following the agency test, there needs to be a special 
relationship between a state and the non-state actor that commits the attack which is 
established when the state instructs or directs the non-state actor to attack or when 
the state exercises “effective control” over the specific non-state attack.67
According to the provisions of ArsiwA, if a state is to be held responsible for 
a certain conduct, it should be attributed to that state. if a conduct of a non-state 
actor is to be attributed to a state, there needs to be close relationship between 
each other.
in light of this, armed attacks launched by isiL cannot be attributed to syria. this 
is because isiL is not a de jure or de facto organ of syria or other states, and does not 
exercise the power of the government over certain parts of syria on behalf of the 
syrian government, nor operate in accordance with direction, order, or control of 
any other state. in particular, isiL operates within the areas that are out of control 
of the syrian government.
then what can be done about the conduct of non-state actors such as isiL? 
Providing that conducts of isiL are not attributed to syria, the lawful solution to this 
problem seems cooperation between a victim state and a territorial state on the 
basis of invitation and consent of the territorial state.
the second question is whether the “unwillingness or inability” of a territorial 
state constitute the ground for military intervention in self-defense. self-defense can 
be invoked when armed attack occurred. the definition of armed attack raises big 
controversies, and no universal legal definition has been reached yet. u.N. General 
Assembly resolutions and judicial decisions of the iCJ and international Criminal 
tribunal stated their legal positions on the issue.
According to Article 3(g) of the definition of Aggression, this could be the case 
if a state either “sent” an irregular group to the territory of another state, or was 
“substantially involved” in a particular use of force perpetrated by this group.68
the iCJ affirmed in its 1986 judgment on Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua that
while the concept of an armed attack includes the dispatch by one state 
of armed bands into the territory of another state, the supply of arms and 
other support to such bands cannot be equated with armed attack.69
66  Arts. 5 & 6 of ArsiwA.
67  Military and Paramilitary Activities case, supra note 65, paras. 116 & 117; Case Concerning Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro) (2007) i.C.J. 43, paras. 398, 402–406, 413 & 414.
68  definition of Aggression, supra note 50. See Corten 2016.
69  Military and Paramilitary Activities case, supra note 65, at 126–127, para. 247.
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According to this, no participation in terrorist acts could never be considered as 
an armed attack and therefore, self-defense cannot be invoked with respect to such 
conduct.
the interpretation of u.N. General Assembly resolutions and judicial decisions of 
the iCJ indicates that while dispatching armed forces or substantially participating 
in the use of force by such armed group amount to armed attack, such actions as 
tolerance, acquiescence, or even assistance do not amount to armed attack, thus 
not qualifying as a ground for invocation of self-defense.
therefore, even though syria was “unwilling or unable” to deal with isiL, this 
cannot be used a legal justification for acting in self-defense.
if the “unwilling or unable” test was accepted, it would ultimately lead to the 
conclusion that tolerance or acquiescence or even “objective inability” of a territorial 
state to obliterate non-state actors operating in its territory amount to an armed 
attack under Article 51 of the u.N. Charter, thus allowing a victim state to unilaterally 
use force in the territorial state.
the third and final question that arises is whether “Preventive” self-defense can 
be invoked in the syrian case.
“Preventive” self-defense has been the subject of debate among international 
scholars for a long period of time, but there seems to be no growing recognition 
in favor of the approach. some scholars argue that the wording “when an armed 
attack occur” in Article 51 is interpreted as referring to the existence of an ongoing 
armed attack, which challenge invocation of self-defense during non-existence of an 
ongoing armed attack. On the other hand, others contend that, due to the genres of 
modern war, if threat of an armed attack exists, it should be suppressed by invoking 
“Preventive” self-defense.
“Preventive” self-defense is, in a word, an approach according to which a state 
can enfeeble another state on the basis of objective judgment of the former that 
the latter is about to launch an armed attack. According to this approach, the 
strengthening of military force such as development and production of missiles or 
airplane carriers of some states might pose as a potential threat to another state. 
therefore, “Preventive” self-defense, which can be allegedly invoked on the basis of 
“existence of threat,” a subjective and hypothetical precondition, is an approach that 
could allow arbitrary use of force.
Neither universal international legal texts nor case law concerning “Preventive” 
self-defense exist, and it is difficult to conclude that state practice thereof has been 
established. it is, therefore, incompatible with international law, to invoke “Preventive” 
self-defense in the syrian case.
Nevertheless, some states participating in the u.s.-led coalition, including the uk 
and France resorted to “Preventive” self-defense, considering that targeted strikes 
could be allowed to put an end to the preparation of criminal activities that could 
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take place on their respective soils.70 if we follow such approach, every state would 
be allowed to have rights to determine whether a certain circumstance is grave 
enough to use force in other state’s territory, thus allowing every state to use force 
under the pretext of “Preventive” self-defense.
the assertion that “Preventive” self-defense can be exercised on the basis of hypo-
thetical and subjective judgment is not supported by judicial decisions of the iCJ.
the iCJ affirmed, in Military and Paramilitary Activities case, that whether 
a measure is necessary or not is not “purely a question for the subjective judgment 
of the party.”71 in the Oil Platforms case, the Court added that
the requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-
defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, 
leaving no room for any “measure of discretion.”72
the statements of the iCJ, which reject subjective judgment of the party, reflects 
its position that “Preventive” self-defense should not be allowed without consent of 
a territorial state nor requesting the international community, including the united 
Nations, to determine the circumstance and take necessary measures.
According to the webster formula,
the necessity of that self-defense must be instant, overwhelming and 
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation,73
thus rejecting the “Preventive” self-defense approach.
in view of the foregoing, it seems that the “Preventive” self-defense as invoked by 
some states participating in the u.s.-led coalition has not been universally accepted. 
the “unwillingness or inability” of the syrian government is purely a subjective and 
hypothetical judgment of the relevant states and it appears groundless to contend that 
there was no choice of means besides military campaign in the syrian territory.
to sum up, the military intervention being carried out by the u.s.-led coalition in 
syria is not compatible with provisions of international law on self-defense.
Conclusion
if the “unwilling or unable” test, as invoked by some states in the u.s.-led coalition 
conducting military intervention in syria, is accepted as a rule of international law, 
70  See Letter dated 7 september 2015, supra note 33; Letter dated 3 december 2015, supra note 34; 
identical letters dated 8 september 2015, supra note 35.
71  Military and Paramilitary Activities case, supra note 65, at 141, para. 282.
72  Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) (2003) i.C.J. 161, para. 73.
73  John B. Moore, A Digest of International Law 412 (washington: Government Printing Office, 1906).
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every state would be given a right to use force on another state’s territory on the basis 
of “unwillingness or inability” of the state to obliterate non-state actors, including 
international terrorist groups.
it is beyond doubt that states must be able to defend themselves when they 
are under attack by non-state actors. No state would tolerate or remain indifferent 
to violations of its territory and infringements of its nationals. this does not mean, 
however, that the “unwilling or unable” test must be accepted. it is because, if the test 
is accepted, violations of territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, as is shown 
in the syrian case, would be even more prevalent and the u.N. system concerning 
international peace and security would be completely useless.
it constitutes a grave challenge to the u.N. system, which is mainly based on 
respect for sovereignty, to use force in a territorial state without any invitation or 
consent of a territorial state, or authorization of the u.N.
in order to prevent ill-cycle of terrorism and retaliation and maintain international 
peace and security, it is essential to eradicate their causative events. unlawful 
invasions and aggressive policies against humanity should be put to an end, and 
efforts of international community should be strengthened to alleviate racial and 
national contradiction and confrontation caused by extreme political ideologies, 
including racism, national chauvinism, and neo-Nazism.
it is equally important to exert efforts to further improve and perfect international 
law. the reason why the “unwilling or unable” test is frequently described as lawful 
is that there remains a gap where such test can gain footing.
it is difficult to predict which state would be the next victim of unilateral military 
intervention justified by the “unwilling or unable” test as is taking place in syria. 
therefore, it is of practical significance to explore appropriate and legitimate 
solutions that can universally apply to the international society and to codify it, 
thus preventing widespread dissemination of the “unwilling or unable” test. if 
international law is steadily supplemented and perfected in accordance with the 
requirements of changing circumstances, the international system governing use 
of force would become more reliable and stable.
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